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1. Introduction. 
1.1. Beliefs. 
Many new models have been proposed to 
quantify uncertainty. But usually they don't 
explain how decisions must be derived. In 
probability theory, the expected utility model 
is well established and strongly justified. We 
show that such expected utility model can be 
derived in the other models proposed to 
quantify someone's belief. The justification is 
based on special bets and some coherence 
requirements that lead to the derivation of the 
so-called generalized insufficient reason 
principle. In Smets (1988b, 1988c, 1989) 
we emphasize the existence of two levels 
where beliefs manifest themselves: the credal 
level where beliefs are entertained and the 
pignistic level where beliefs are used to 
take decisions (pignus = a bet in Latin, Smith 
1961). 
Uncertainty induces beliefs, i.e. graded 
dispositions that guide our behaviour. 
Translated within a normative approach, this 
leads usually to the construction of a model to 
quantify beliefs that is linked directly to 
"rational" agent behaviour within betting and 
decision contexts (DeGroot 1970). Bayesians 
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have convincingly showed that if decisions 
mu s t  be "coherent", our belief over the 
various outcomes must be quantified by a 
probability function. This result is accepted 
here. Hence at the pinistic level beliefs are 
quantified by probability functions. But 
probability functions are u sed to quantify our 
b elief only when a decision is really 
involved. That beliefs are necessary 
ingredients for our decisions does not mean 
that beliefs cannot be entertained without any 
revealing behaviour manifestations (Smith and 
Jones, p.l47). 
The probability function that quantifies our 
belief at the pignistic level reflects an 
underlying credal state. At the credal level, 
quantified beliefs can be represented by other 
models like the transferable belief model 
(Smets 1988a, 1989a), the possibility theory 
model (Dubois and Prade 1988), the upper 
and lower probabilities models Good (1950), 
convex sets of probability functions (Kyburg 
1987b), Dempster-Shafer's models (Shafer 
1976), etc ... The difference between these 
models are studied in detail in Smets ( 1989a, 
1989b ). The major difference results from the 
existence or the absence of an underlying 
probability function. 
In Smets (1989a) we present the semantic of 
belief functions within the transferable belief 
model. It is based on betting behaviors and 
the consideration of varying betting frames. 
One should notice that the transferable belief 
model does not correspond to the Dempster­
Shafer model as used in AI, but is very close 
to what Shafer developed in his book (Shafer 
1976). 
All beliefs entertained by an agent are defined 
relative to a given doxastic cor pus that 
consists of all pieces of information in the 
agent'� possession. Our approach is 
normative: the agent is an ideal rational subject 
and the doxastic corpus is deductively closed. 
The function that quantifies our belief at the 
credal level will be called here a credibility 
function, denoted Cr. We introduce such 
name as a generic for the familly of functions 
proposed to quantify beliefs like the 
probability functions, the belief functions, the 
lower probabilities functions, the necessity 
functions and their dual. 
Our derivation of the pignistic probability 
function fits with any credibility function. It is 
not restricted to any of the above mentioned 
functions. It fits with Dempster-Shafer model, 
but is not restricted to it. Hence the 
"credibility" qualification used to enhance the 
generality of our results. 
Beliefs being the governing principles of our 
decisions, the (pignistic) probability functions 
observed at the pignistic level must be derived 
from the credibility functions present at the 
credal level. Some forms of coherence must 
be satisfied by this transformation. These 
coherence requirements lead to the derivation 
of an unique transformation. This paper 
presents these requirements and the derived 
transformation that turns out to be an 
application of the generalized insufficient 
reason principle (Dubois and Prade 1982, 
Williams 1982, Smets 1988a) 
1.2. The propositional space. 
Let n be a non empty finite set called the 
frame of discernment equipped with a 
Boolean algebra 9l of some of its subsets. 
Every element of 9l is called a proposition. 
The pair (Q, 9l) is called a pro positional 
space. By abuse of language, the elements of 
n are called the elementary propositions. 
Any algebra 9l defined on Q contains two 
special propositions: In and On where ln is 
the set of all elementary propositions of Q and 
On is the complement of In relative to n. 
The standard Boolean notation is used for the 
propositions of 9l: A stands for the 
complement of A relative to Q, and AuB, 
AnB denotes the set-theoretic union and 
intersection of propositions A and B ofCJt. 
A <::B means that all elementary propositions 
of A are elementary propositions of B. Each 
proposition in 9t, except On, such that its 
intersection with any proposition in 3t is either 
itself or On is called an atom of 9l. Every 
proposition in � can be described as the union 
of atoms of 9l. 
On n. we define a valuation that maps every 
element of Q into {true. false} such that at 
most one element of Q is true; this element is 
called the 'truth'. A proposition in Q is true iff 
one of its elementary propositions is true. 
Two propositions A and B are doxastically 
equivalent (or simply equivalent) if they 
share the same truth value for all valuations 
that satisfy the doxastic corpus constraints: it 
is denoted A=B. 
2. The credibility function. 
Suppose an agent, with his/her doxastic 
corpus, entertains beliefs over a frame n, i.e. 
he/she assigns degrees of belief to the 
elements of 9l, an algebra defined on n. It is 
postulated that degrees of belief are quantified 
by a point-valued "credibility" function Cr 
which maps � into a closed interval of the real 
line, is monotonic for inclusion, reaches its 
lower limit for On and its upper limit for ln if 
In is equivalent to a tautology 't. (That ln 
might be different from a tautology reflects the 
distinction between the open-world and the 
closed-world assumptions as explained in 
Smets (1988a). 
Axiom AI: Let a propositional space (Q, 9l). 
Given a doxastic corpus, there exists a unique 
function Cr that quantifies the agent's belief 
for every proposition of 9t. 
The triple (Q, 9\, Cr) is called a credibility 
s pace and denoted by tp. The index i in tp i 
corresponds to the index of (Qi, 9\j, Cri) 
Axiom A2: Domain. 
Given a credibility space tp, Cr: 9t�[$, wl 
where [$, wl is an interval of the real line. 
Axiom A3: Monotonicity. 
Given a credibility space tp, VA, Be 9\, if 
A �B. then Cr(A)!SCr(B) 
Axiom A4: Lower limit. 
Given a credibility space tp, Cr(On) = $ 
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Axiom AS: Upper limit. 
Given a credibility space tJ, if ln:-r, then 
Cr(ln) ='I' 
Doxastically equivalent propositions should 
always receive equal credibilities (Kyburg, 
1987a) 
Axiom A6: equi-credibi1ity of 
doxastically equivalent propositions. 
Suppose two credibility spaces (Qi, 9tj, Cq), 
i=1,2. If Ate9tt. A2e9t2 and At:A2, then 
Cq(At) = Cr2(A2). 
Suppose two credibility spaces (Q, 9tj, Crj), 
i= 1 ,2, defined on the same space n. Axiom 
A6 implies that those propositions that belong 
to both algebras will always receive the same 
credibility as they are logically equivalent. 
Hence the credibility given to a proposition 
does not depend on the structure of the 
algebra to which the proposition belongs. 
Axiom A6 permits to prove the following 
anonymity theorem. 
Theorem 1: Let G be a permutation function 
defined on n. For A en, let G(A) = {G(x): 
xeA}. Let a credibility space (Q, 9t, Cr). Let 
Cr' be the credibility function defined on 9t' = 
{G(A): Ae9t}. Then, by axiom A6, "VAeCft., 
Cr'(G(A)) = Cr(A) 
3. a-combined credibility spaces. 
We are going to show that the set of 
credibility functions defined on a 
propositional space (Q, 9t) is a convex set. 
To show this we introduce a combined bet 
schema. Suppose two propositional spaces 
(Q i, 9ti) i=1,2, where the atoms of 9tj are 
{Ait, A12 • . . .  , Ain}- Let N = {1, 2 ... n}. 
Such a pair of propositional spaces (and the 
corresponding credibility spaces) are said 
combinable. 
Let Pi , i=l,2 be two combinable credibility 
spaces. Suppose a random generator that 
generates event R with P(R=r)=a and 
P(R=s )= 1-a. Define the a-c ombine d 
credibility space p 12 = (!212. 9t 12 , Cr12) 
with atoms {At2j: j = 1, 2 ... n}. The valuation 
on !212 is such that At2j is true if (r occurs 
and Atj is true) or (s occurs and A2j is true). 
For any ICN, let Ail= .u Aij and At2I = \J JE I JE I 
At2j- Ail and At2I are the propositions of the 
algebras 9ti and 9tt2· Ail is true if one of the 
propositions Aif jel, is true. At2l is true if (r 
occurs and Au ts true) or (s occurs and A2r ts 
true). 
II A 11 I A121 I A21 II 
I� A122 I A22 II 
ILSJ A12i I A2i II 
... 
I� A12n �I 
Figure 1: Two combinable credibility spaces 
with atoms Ati and A2i. i=l, ... n, and the a 
combined credibility space with atoms A t2i· 
Atom At2i is true whenever (R=r and Ati is 
true) or (R=s and A21 is true) where 
P(R=r)=a and P(R""s):= 1-a. 
We will show in §4 that under natural 
requirements, one has: 
Cqz(At2I) =a Cq(Au) + (1-a) Crz(A2r) 
Suppose two combinable credibility spaces 
p j, i= 1 ,2, and their associated a-combined 
credibility space .f012· The following axioms 
are postulated for credibility function Cr12. 
Axiom Cl:pointwise compositionality. 
There exists a function F:[.p, '1'12�!<1». 'l'l such 
that VKN 
Cr12(A12I) = F( Cq(Au), Cr2(A21) )  
Axiom C 2: continuity. 
F(x,y) is continuous in (x,y)e [c)>, '1']2 
Axiom C3: strict monotony. 
F(x,y) is strictly monotonic for x, ye [cp, 'l'l 
Axiom C4: idempotency. 
F(x,x) = x Vxe (<jl, 'l'l 
321 
Pointwise compositionality is justified by t�e 
idea that Cq2(At2d should not be changed tf 
we replace 9tj by the algebra 9tj' whose only 
two atoms are An and Air where I' is the 
complement of I relative to N (with parallel 
definitions for 9tl2). 
Continuity is classically accepted, it could be 
weakened but without real profit. 
Strict monotony is postulated as we consider 
that Cr12 should be sensitive to both of its 
components. The credibi�it� . of one 
proposition in 9tt should no,t ��h1b1ted even 
locally the impact of our credtbihty on another 
proposition in 9t2 (and vice versa). 
Finally idempotency reflects the idea that if � 1 
and � 2 happen to be the same credibility 
spaces, then Cq2 = Crt:: Cr2. 
In theorem 2, we show that F satisfies the 
bisynunetry equation 
F( F(x,y) , F(u,v) ) = F( F(x,u), F(y,v) ) 
whose solution is detailed in Aczel ( 1966, pg. 
287) 
Figure 1: creation in the proof of theorem 2 
of9tt234 by combining 9tt2 with 9t34, or 9t13 
with 9tz4· 
Theorem 2: Given two combinable 
credibility spaces pt. i= 1 ,2, and their 
associated a-combined credibility space � 12. 
given axioms Cl to C4, then the F function in 
axiom Cl satisfies: 
F(x,y) = f( a.f-l(x) + (1-a).f-l(y)) (1) 
where f(x)e [�.'lf1, is continuous, strictly 
monotonic, f($) = $and f('l') = 'If, and ae [0, 
1]. 
Proof: Consider four combinable credibility spaces 
P i. i=l,4, where the atoms of9ti are {Ail···· Ain}. 
Build the a-combined credibility spaces �12· P34. 
&013 and P24· 
By axiom Cl, VI�N. i,je {1, 2, 3, 4}, Crij(Aiji) = F( 
Cri(Aii) , Crj(Ajt) ) 
Consider also the join a-combined credibility space 
�(12)(34) = (0(12)(34)• 9t(t2)(34)• Cr(t2)(34)) b�ild 
from � 12 and p 34· Let the result from success1ve 
uses of the R-device be stochastically independent. 
Let Rt. R2 and R3 be the three independent random 
variables generated by the R-device that will be used 
respectively to select between tJ 12 and P 34, 
between� 1 and �2. between P3 and P4· Let RjE {ri, 
sj} with P(Rj=ri) = a for i=l, 2, 3. Proposition 
A(t2)(34)j in 9t(12)(34) is true if (rt and f2 occur 
and Aij is true) or (TJ and S2 and A2j) or (Sl and f3 
and A3j) or (s 1 and s3 and A4j). 
Consider then the join a-combined credibility space 
P(l3)(24) build from Pl3 and P 24· Proposition 
A(l3)(24)j. in 9t(l3)(24) is true if (q and f2 and Atj) 
or (q and 52 and A3j) or (st and £3 and A2j) or (SI and 
s3 andA4j). 
Hence to decide that propositions A(l2)(34)j and 
A(l3)(24)j are true, one check the propositions within 
9tj where the index i is selected by a random process, 
each value having the same chance to be selected in 
the two join ll-combined credibility spaces P(12)(34) 
andP(13}(24): P(i=l) = ll2, P(i=2) = P(i=3) = ll(l-n) 
and P(i=4) = {l-a}2 
This identity means that the credibility functions 
Cr(t2)(34) and Cr(l3)(24) are identical, hence the 
bisyrnmetry equation: VI�N 
F(F( Cq(AU) , Crz(A2I) ) ,  F( Cf3(A3I) ,  Cr4(A41))) 
=F(F( Cq ( A  II) , Cr3( A3I ) )  , F( Crz( A 2I) , 
Cr4(A4I))) 
By axioms C2 and C3, F is continuous and strictly 
increasing in both variables x,ye (!p,ro], hence its 
general solution is 
F(x,y) = f( a.f·lcx) + b.r-l(y)+ c )  
where f(x)e [$,'If], is continuous and strictly monotone 
(see theorem l, page 287, Aczel 1966). By axiom C4, 
F(x,x) = x, then c = 0 and a + b = 1. Such F function 
satisfies axioms A4 and A5 with f(lj>) = 4> and f('l') = 
'I'· QED 
4. The pignistic probability function. 
Suppose we have a credibility space p = (.Q, 
� .Cr). When a decision must be taken that 
depends on the proposition in � that will be 
true, one must construct a pignistic probability 
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function on 9t in order to take the optimal 
decision that maximizes the expected utility. 
We assume, as explained in the introduction, 
that the pignistic probability function defined 
on 9t is a function of the credibility function 
Cr. Hence one must transform Cr into a 
probability function P. This transformation is 
called hereafter the r9\ transformation where 
the 9t index mentions the Boolean algebra on 
which Cr and P are defined: so P = r9t(Cr). It 
is also postulated that the transformation 
depends only on the cardinality of 9t, not on 
the nature of its atoms. 
Axiom Pl : Let a credibility space p = (Q, 
9\, Cr) and P = r9t(Cr). For any atom (l) of 9\, 
P((l)) = g((l), {Cr(A): Ae9t}) 
Axiom Pl formalizes the idea that our beliefs 
guide our behaviours. Evaluation of P for non 
atoms of 9t is obtained by adding the 
appropriate probabilities. 
Axiom P2: Suppose two combinable 
credibility spaces p 1 and p z, and their 
associated a-combined credibility space p 12· 
Let P1 ::=: r9t1(Cq), Pz = r9t2(Crz} and P12 = 
r9\12(Cr12). Let Atj. A2j and A12j jeN={ 1, 
2 ... n}, be the atoms of the three algebras. Let 
An = _ u Atj . A21 =.u A2j and At2I =.uAt2j JE I JE I JE I 
where I�N. Then, VI�N. 
Pt2CA121) = n.P1(Au) + (l-n).P2(A2r) 
Axiom P2 formalizes in the present context 
the well-known property: 
P(X) = P(XIA).P(A) + P(XIA).P(A) 
as the Pi(Au) are the conditional probabilities 
P 12 of A121 in context 9\ i and a is the 
probability of the context 9\ 1· e.g. P1 (An) = 
Pt2(ArzriR=r). 
Axiom P2 implies that the function f in 
theorem 2 is such that f(x) = x. 
Indeed suppose Crj are probability functions Pi, then 
Crt2 is also a probability function P 1 2 with: 
Crt2(At2I) = PI2(At2I) = Pt2(A12IIR=r) a + 
Ptz(At2IIR=s) (1-n) 
As Pt2(AI2IIR=r) = Pt(Ali) and P I2(At2 IIR=s) = 
Pz(A2I), (1) becomes: 
Ptz(At2J) = F(Pt(Ati), Pz(Azi)) = f(af-1(Pt(All)) + 
(l·aW1(P2(A2J))) = aPJ(Ati) + ( l-a)P2(A2I) 
i.e. f(af"l(x) + (1-a)f"l(y)) =ax+ (l-n) y 
what implies that r-l(x)"' x and a= a. 
Therefore (1) becomes: 
Cr12(A12r} =a Cq(An) + (1-n) Cli.(Azr) (2) 
The anonymity property of theorem I is 
generalized to pignistic probabilities. 
Axiom P3: anonym i t y  : Let G be a 
permutation function defined on Q. For 
A� n, let G(A) = {G(x): XE A}. Let a 
credibility space (Q, 9\, Cr) and P = rgr. Let 
the credibility space (.Q, 9t', Cr') where 9t' = 
{G(A): AE9t}. Let P' = rgr·. Then VAE9t, 
P'(G(A)) = P(A). 
Let a credibility space {P = (Q, 9t, Cr) and P = 
r9\(Cr) . As far as P is a probability function, 
it ·must satisfy the following obvious 
properties: 
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Axiom Ql : Sum property: If Cr(ln) = 
'If, then P{ln) = 1 
Axiom Q2: False event: If Xe 9\ and 
X:0, then Cr(A) == Cr(Au X) \i Ae 9t and 
P(X) = 0. (0 is the logical contradiction) 
Axiom Q3: Credibility = Probability: 
If Cr happens to be a probability function P 
defined on 9\, then r9\(P) = P. 
Axiom Q 1 tells that if 9t is rich enough so that 
ln is equivalent to a tautology, then the 
probabilities given to the atoms of 9t add to 
one. 
Axiom Q2 tells that the credibility given to a 
proposition is not changed when one adds any 
impossible proposition to it. 
Axioms Q3 recognizes that if someone's 
credibility is already described by a 
probability function, then the pignistic 
probabilities and the credibilities are equal. 
Theorem 3 shows that the g function of 
axiom PI is a linear function of its arguments 
Cr(A): Ae9t. Figure 3 illustrates the origin of 
this linearity. There are two ways by which 
P12 can be constructed: either build each Pi 
and combine them or combine both Cri into 
Cr12 and transform the last into P12· Both 
approaches must give the same answer. 
9\1 Cr 1 
r9t 
Ct 
1 
Axioms Q1 to Q3 permit then to derive all the 
coefficients of (3). 
F1 
9t 12 Cr12 
r9\12 • �2 ... 
l-et 
r9\ 
9\2 Cr2 
2 
p2 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of the linearity of r. 
r9\ 1l aCq + ( l -a)Cr2 ) = a r9\1 (Crt) + (1-a) r9\2(Cr2) 
Theorem 3. Given a credibility space (Q, 
9\, Cr) and P = r9\(Cr). Given (2), axioms Pl 
and P2, then there exists a and b such that for 
any atom co of 9\, 
P(co) == L a(co,A).Cr(A) + b(co) (3) 
Ae9\ 
Proof.Let P(R=r) =ex, J3 = l-ex, XI= Cq(All) and YI 
= Cr:z(Azi). (2) becomes: VI�N 
Cq2(AI2I) = a.xJ + j3.y1 
Replacing P in axiom P2, one has: (as co is fixed, it 
is dropped from the notation) 
g(a.xJ+J3.yh a.x2+13·Y2····> s 
a.g(xt. x2 ... ) + j3.g(YJ, Y2···> 
The proof is based on the transformation of this 
relation into a Pexider equation (Aczel, 1966, p. 141) 
and then a Cauchy equation (Aczel, 1966, p. 214). 
Hence g is linear in its components and the 
coefficients may depend only on I and co. 
QED 
As a consequence of the anonymity axiom P3 
and theorem 1, it can easily be shown that the 
coefficients a and b in (3) depend only on the 
number of atoms in A and (l)('lA. 
Theorem 4. Given theorem 3, theorem 1 
and axiom P3, relation (3) becomes: Vatom co 
of.Q 
P(co) "" I a([COt"'IAI,JAI).Cr(A) + b 
Ae9\ 
where IAI is the number of atoms of 9\ in A. 
Theorem 5: Given a credibility space (Q, 9\, 
Cr) and P=r9t(Cr). Given theore m 4. Axioms 
Q1 to Q3 imply: 
<!1=0 'Jf=l 
and (3) becomes for any atom COj of 9\, 
P(coj) = Cr(coj) + 
n 
� � n�l L(Cr(rojuAr))- Cr(Ar)) L...J ( i )jel 
i=l lll=i 
(4) 
where I<;;;;N == {1, 2 ... n} 
The transformation r9\ permits the 
construction of a probability function (called 
the pignistic probability function) at the 
pignistic level given any credibility function at 
the credal level. 
5. C o-credibility function. 
Given a credibility function Cr on a 
propositional space (.Q, 9\), define the co­
credibility function CoCr as 
CoCr(A)"" Cr(ln)- Cr( A) 'v'A�Q 
Replacing Cr by its dual CoCr in theorem 3 
leads to the same probability function P. For 
any pair (Cr, CoCr) 
r9\(Cr) = rst(CoCr) 
Using Cr or its dual CoCr is equivalent. 
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6. The Moebius trans formations of  
Cr. 
For any credibility space g:>, there are two 
Moebius transforms v and w of the credibility 
function defined on 9t such that ';f Ae 9t (with 
all summations taken on those B that are 
propositions of9t): 
v(A) = L ( -1 )IAHBI.Cr(B) 
B<:;;;A 
v(On) = 1 - Cr(la) 
Cr(A) = L, v(B) 
�B<;:A 
w(A) == I, ( -1 )IAHBI.(Cr(ln)-Cr(B)) 
B<;:A 
w(On) = 1 - Cr(ln) 
Cr(A) = L, w(B) 
BnA.e0 
The transformation between Cr, v and w are 
one to one. In belief functions theory, the v's 
are the basic belief masses if Cr is a belief 
function, and the w's are the basic belief 
masses if Cr is a plausibility function. 
Given the v and w functions, one has: 
CoCr(A) = L, w(B) 
0,cB�A 
and CoCr(A) == L, v(B) 
BnA.e0 
Should Cr be respectively a belief, necessity, 
lower probability or probability function then 
CoCr would be a plausibility, possibility, 
upper probability or probability function, and 
vice versa. 
Replacing Cr by v or w, (4) becomes: 
P(roj) == I, v(AJ) I Ill = L w(AJ) /III 
jel<;:N jei�N 
where the AI's are the propositions of 9l. 
IAnBI 
Hence P(A) = I. v(B) """j'B'I 
B<:;;;.Q 
IAnBI 
= I. w(B) i'i3l 
B�Q 
T/Ae9t 
a solution that corresponds t o  the 
generalized insu f f i cient reason 
principle: for each Be 9t, v(B) (or w(B)) is 
distributed equally among the atoms of B, and 
P(ro) is the sum of those parts of v (or w) that 
were given to the atom ro. 
7. Conclusions. 
The generalized insufficient reason principle 
had already been proposed intuitively as a 
potential solution to derive a probability 
function from a belief function (Dubois and 
Prade 1982, Williams 1982, Smets 1988a) 
but never justified. We provide an axiomatic 
justification of this principle based on 
coherence between combined bets and 
applicabfe for any measure of belief whose 
major property is to be monotonic for set 
inclusion. 
Hence any model for quantified beliefs can be 
endowed with the needed procedure to 
transform someone's beliefs entertained at the 
credallevel into a pignistic probability that can 
be used at the pignistic level when decisions 
must be taken. This transformation and its 
justification should answer to the classical 
criticism of the Dempster-Shafer model and 
other models based on belief functions, on 
possibility functions, on upper and lower 
probabilities functions, etc ... Decisions are 
then based on expected utility theory, using 
the pignistic probability function to compute 
the needed expectations. 
The link of this model with practical decision 
problems is straighforward. G iven a 
credibility function Cr that quantifies your 
degree of belief, if you must make a decision, 
transform Cr into the pignistic probability 
function by applying the generalized 
insufficient reason principle and then use this 
probability function to select the optimal 
decision. The whole classical decision theory 
(the expected utility theory) applies directly 
(DeGroot 1970, Raiffa 1970) 
325 
A final question is: why to bother with a two­
level model if decisions are to be based on 
probability functions as advocated by the 
Bayesians. What is the need for introducing a 
credal level and credibility functions. The 
answer is fully developed in Srnets (1989a) 
where examples are provided that show that 
the introduction of a two-level model leads to 
decisions different from those obtained when 
only one level is considered. Let a first 
dox.astic corpus with the induced credibility 
function Cr on some propositional space (Q, 
�) and the corresponding pignistic probability 
function P=P:Jt(Cr). Suppose a new piece of 
evidence "A is true" with Ae � is added to the 
dox.astic corpus. Where to apply the updating 
that reflects this conditioning on A. We 
advocate it should be applied at the credal 
level, by conditioning Cr into CrA. The 
pignistic probability r9\(CrA) is derived from 
Cr A. It is usually different from the 
conditional probability function P A obtained 
by conditioning P on A (see Mr. Jones 
murdering paradigm in Smets, 1988b, 1988c, 
1989a ). 
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